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In the 1980s, the Thai government tried to legalize squatters living in certain geographical areas 
by issuing special titles that allowed for cultivation but restricted the sale and rental of the land. 
Using data from 2,874 farming households collected in 1997 and a differences-in-differences 
empirical strategy, we compare the differential rental rates between secured and unsecured plots 
in reform and non-reform areas. In reform areas, households are more likely to lease secured plots 
and cultivate unsecured plots. In addition, using land rental rates and prices, we estimate a 6 
percent premium due to expropriation risk. In other areas, however, land rights do not influence 
leasing decisions and no risk premium is found. These results indicate that this property rights 
reform distorted the land rental market by triggering a sense of insecurity among owners of 
undocumented land. Since the program targeted more developed areas, our results may 
underestimate the true negative impact of the reform. 
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It is often argued that well functioning land markets play an important role in economic
development by improving the allocation of resources. The extent to which they work,
however, is determined by the environment and the speci¯c government policies or insti-
tutions in place (World Bank, 2003; de Janvry et al., 2001).
In this paper, we show empirically how a government property rights reform created
an unforseen negative externality that distorted the land rental market. In the 1980s, the
Thai government tried to legalize squatters living in o±cially declared forest reserves and
other public land by issuing special titles that allowed for cultivation but prohibited the
sale and rental of the land. Violations of these restrictions could result in expropriation
of the land. Before the reform, landowners were leasing plots of land irrespective of
whether or not they had a legal deed. We claim that by enforcing the restrictions in these
reform titles, the government managed to scare neighboring owners of undocumented land.
Suddenly, these owners now feared that undocumented land would also be expropriated
if leased, despite the restrictions only applied to reform titles. Supporting this claim, we
¯nd that in areas where this reform took place, leased plots are signi¯cantly more likely
to be secured with full ownership titles than elsewhere. In addition, the rental rate of
unsecured plots in reform areas include a risk of expropriation premium.
Although the speci¯c example is from Thailand, the ¯ndings are important because
they shed light into the relevance of the timing and the design of property rights reforms.
The literature on formal land titling formalized in Besley (1995), has typically found
large private bene¯ts in measures, such as investment on the land (Banerjee et al., 2002;
Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2004), access to credit (Feder et al., 1988a; Do and Iyer, 2004)
and labor supply (Field, 2003). The policy we study, not only resulted in small private
bene¯ts (Feder et al., 1988b) but it actually created large social costs by distorting the
land rental market. In this sense, this paper contributes to the literature of the e±ciency
of land markets (Baland et al., 2000; Macours, 2003; Deininger and Jin, 2003; Goldstein
and Udry, 2004).
The results suggests that the introduction of formal partial rights may do more harm
than good, and that instead, full ownership rights should have been issued.
The data used in the paper come from a cross-section survey conducted in 1997 in two
2provinces of the Central region and two in the Northeast region of Thailand. The sample
design was special in that villages inside and outside o±cially declared forest reserve were
surveyed. In addition, reform titles were issued in some villages but not others. Thus,
survey villages fall into one of four bins depending on whether or not they are forest and
program (reform) villages.1 Depending on the village, plots can have full ownership titles,
program titles or can have either less secure titles or no document at all.
Program placement was not random as it targeted more developed villages. As stated
in the Thai Forestry Sector Master Plan (1993, pp.64) the program was seen as the
¯rst step towards the future privatization of the land, although this privatization never
materialized. Therefore, program titles were issued in villages located in areas that were
supposedly more suitable for agriculture and that would never revert back to forest reserve.
If we believe that more developed villages have better functioning land markets, then our
results would underestimate the true negative impact of the reform.
The econometric identi¯cation uses a di®erences-in-di®erences approach by comparing
across village bins whether a plot security a®ects the probability of being leased. We
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the household level by using household ¯xed
e®ects, following Shaban (1987) and Jacoby and Mansuri (2003, 2004). This approach
allows us to make a clear case for the fear of expropriation driving the observed behavior
in the land market. While it is usually di±cult to control for unobserved land quality, even
with household ¯xed e®ects, any story about unobserved land quality fails to rationalize
why one would expect land rights to matter in program areas but not elsewhere.
The paper develops a stylized dynamic general equilibrium model which shows how, in
the presence of expropriation risk, mostly {if not only{ titled (i.e. secured) land is leased.
In this context, only titled land is leased if it alone su±ces to equate all the agents'
marginal productivity. In this case, the Pareto optimum is achieved. However, if there is
too little titled land, then the equilibrium is such that some untitled land {unsecured and
thus subject to expropriation{ is leased and landowners and tenants cultivate at di®erent
productivity levels. In this case, the expropriation risk results in a welfare loss.
In the alternative case of no expropriation risk, land rights do not predict what plots
1Throughout the paper we denote as forest villages those villages inside or adjacent to o±cially declared
forest reserves. Likewise, a program village is de¯ned as a village where the government agencies that
implemented the reform issued special titles.
3are leased and the Pareto optimum is always achieved. The ¯ndings thus con¯rm the
predictions of the model.
In addition, we derive the equilibrium pricing equations for both titled and untitled
land. Using data from the asking price of the plot and its rental price, we estimate a
probability of expropriation of 6 percent in program and forest villages, precisely where
the reform titles were enforced. The fear of expropriation created a wedge between the
marginal productivity of households that lease in and those that lease out, evidencing
that the reform distorted the land market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background informa-
tion about land rights and tenancy in Thailand. Section 3 presents the model in greater
detail. In Section 4 we describe the data used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the
econometric speci¯cations to be estimated and Section 6 the regression results. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
Historically, all land in the Kingdom of Thailand belonged to the King. Throughout
most of its history, population density was low and thus increases of agricultural output
were obtained by expanding into forests and clearing them. Little concern was given to
formal ownership registration and the government did little to interfere. The opening of
the country to international trade and population growth brought signi¯cant incentives
for production expansion, and pressures for a more secure form of land ownership (Feeny,
1982). In 1872 King Chulongkorn introduced procedures for the recognition of private
rights in land. Title documents for the rice land were established in the main rice pro-
ducing areas. Several modi¯cations were enacted over the years culminating in the Land
Code of 1954, which is still in e®ect today.
Nowadays, land is classi¯ed into private land, extending over 19 million hectares in
1994 (40 percent of total land), and public or government land. Government land
covers 23 million hectares, including national parks, wildlife sanctuaries and land reform
areas.2 As mentioned in the introduction, some of the forest areas have been squatted. In
2The land reform started in 1975 and that will be covered in greater detain in Subsection 2.3.
41993, only 13 million hectares had forest cover as the rest had been degraded or converted
into farmland (Chirapanda, 2000).
We now describe in greater detail land ownership in private land, forest reserve areas
and land reform areas.
2.1 Private Land: The Land Code of 1954
The Land Code of 1954 contains procedures for the issuance of documents recognizing title
to land in non-forest areas and the maintenance of the land register. It de¯nes di®erent
types of documents depending on whether the owner can claim occupancy, utilization or
legal possession of the land. The most valuable document is the NS-4 (chanod), a full
unrestricted legal title. This document enables the owner to sell, transfer and legally
mortgage the land.
The documents related to land utilization are NS-3 and NS-3K, \Certi¯cate of Use"
and \Exploitation Testimonial" respectively. These documents certify that the occupant
has made use of the land for a prescribed period of time. Both the NS-3 and NS-3K
enable legal transfer by sale or will, and in this sense are similar to the NS-4.3 According
to Williamson (1983) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, banks will lend
equally irrespective of whether the land has a title or a certi¯cate of utilization.4
Although NS-4, NS-3 and NS-3K are the only documents allowing the owner to trans-
act freely and legally, there are other documents de¯ned in the Code that support own-
ership. The NS-2 document is a \Preemptive Certi¯cate" which authorizes temporary
occupation of land. It does not allow legal transfer of land except by inheritance and
therefore it is not used as collateral. Finally, there exists the \Claim Certi¯cate" SK-1,
which was issued during the implementation of the Code.
Still in the 1980s, the majority of the labor force in Thailand was employed in agri-
culture. Low real incomes in rural areas and widespread poverty motivated further land
3The di®erence between NS-3 and NS-3K documents lies in the mapping system used. NS-3 certi¯cates
were granted between 1954 and 1972, and were mapped in isolation by tape surveys. The land was
described in the certi¯cate by metes and bounds with an approximate diagram showing the shape of the
parcel. After 1972, systematic surveys using unrecti¯ed aerial photographs were introduced (NS-3K),
where land is described on the certi¯cate by a deed plan.
4Using the Townsend-Thai dataset, Gin¶ e (2005) also ¯nds that land plots with either NS-3, NS-3K or
NS-4 documents are used indistinctively as collateral in loans from formal institutions.
5settlement. The Department of Lands (DOL) was hard-pressed to meet the demand for
land records, but as Rattanabirabongse et al. (1998) suggest, with the resources and
procedures available at that time, it would take 200 years to distribute title deeds to all
eligible land holders.
Therefore, in 1984, the Thai government started the implementation of a World Bank
funded project aiming to strengthen the capacity of the DOL to perform land survey-
ing, registration and documentation. The main objective of the Land Titling Program
(LTP) was to systematically award title documents (NS-4) to eligible landowners who
had no documents or possessed preliminary documents (NS-2, SK-1) and the conversion
of utilization certi¯cates (NS-3, NS-3K) held by many landowners to titles.
Systematic registration under the LTP was undertaken on the basis of whole sub-
districts. A team of surveyors would go into the ¯eld and, with the Village Head, would
have land occupiers, in the presence of people with rights in adjoining land, indicating
the positions of the boundary corners.5 The documents provided by the land holder6 and
the plot measurements would be given to the adjudicator who after revisions and checks
with the cadastral maps would approve the issuance of the title.7
While the cost of the systematic land titling activity was largely underwritten by the
government, fees for sporadic issuance of title were charged on the basis of full recovery
of costs.8 Under the systematic registration land holders were only charged a nominal
amount for the cost of corner marks - 110 baht/title (about US$2.55).
Since the cost of registering a plot was so low, one is left wondering why not all plots
were registered. The answer lies in what constitutes forest reserve. Since the Land Code
regulates private land only, all titles issued under the LTP had to be located in non-forest
areas.
5There were procedures in place if disputes were to arise, however, under the LTP very few disputes
that could not be settled in the ¯eld took place and few if any appeals were made to the court system.
6These documents include personal identity and family history information and one piece of evidence
of ownership: preemptive certi¯cates (NS-2) and proof of use, NS3 or NS3K certi¯cates if applying for a
title, SK-1 or land tax receipts (PBT certi¯cates).
7If the landowner possessed an NS-3K document, there was an automatic conversion procedure by
overlaying the unrecti¯ed map with the recti¯ed photomap. A judgment was then made on whether a
title could be produced from the NS-3K certi¯cate, and in some cases a ¯eld inspection was undertaken.
8Sporadic registration takes place when the land holder, out of the his or her own initiative makes an
application to the land o±ce. This application can only be accepted where there is an existing cadastral
map.
6The LTP evolved in four di®erent phases, and although the last phase was scheduled to
¯nish in October 2004, all the provinces in the Townsend-Thai dataset had been covered
by the LTP at the time of the survey.
Table 1 reports data from Buriram province, the only province present in the Townsend-
Thai data set (post LTP) and in the survey by Feder et al. (1987, 1988a, 1988b) before the
implementation of the LTP. Table 1 provides evidence of the success of the LTP.9 While
Feder et al. (1988a) report that only 12 percent of legally owned land is covered by full
title (NS-4), the Townsend-Thai data report a 43 percent of titles in roughly comparable
regions. There is also clear evidence of the conversion from NS-3, NS-3K certi¯cates or
other documents to NS-4. However, about 45 percent of all plots still were not covered
by a NS-4 or NS-3, NS-3K title even after the implementation of the LTP. As mentioned
before, some of these plots were located in either o±cially declared forest reserve areas or
in land reform areas.
2.2 Public Land: Forest Reserve Areas
About 60 percent of all public land is forest land. It is administered by the Royal Forest
Department (RFD) but like many other developing countries, Thailand has faced the
illegal occupation and use of state-owned land by a large number of farmers.
Feeny (1984) estimates that forest reserve coverage dropped from 70 percent at the
turn of the century to less than 30 percent in the mid 1980s. In 1961 the Thai Cabinet
set a policy that 50 percent of the country be reserved for forestry. In 1964 the National
Forest Reserve Act was passed, designating various areas within Thailand as gazetted
forest reserves and detailing limitations to their exploitation.10 Agricultural cultivation
within those areas was speci¯cally prohibited. The declaration of a new forest reserve
area also changed over time. Under the previous law of 1938, government o±cials had
to check the area to be declared and consulted with village heads. The complexity of
9See Rattanabirabongse et al. (1998) and Heath (1999) for a more detailed explanation of the Land
Titling Project.
10Other legislation that gives RFD jurisdiction over forest land include the National Park Act of 1961,
the Wildlife Conservation and Protection of 1992 and the Cabinet Resolution on Watershed Classi¯cation.
7these discussions may explain the slow progress made in forest demarcation while the
law was e®ective (Vandergeest, 1995; Wittayapak, 1996 and Fujita, 2003). The law of
1964 simpli¯ed the procedures for declaring reserve forest by making them less subject to
community discussion and consent. There were no public meetings and local village heads
were not required to approve the proposed demarcation. In a way, the legal de¯nition of
forest changed from land not legally claimed and cultivated to land demarcated on a map
as forest reserve.
Despite this new government initiative, in the mid 1980s about a ¯fth of the land o±-
cially designated as forest reserve was permanently occupied and cultivated by squatters.
It represented 21 percent of the land under cultivation.
After the law was enacted, the ongoing encroachment and illegal logging can partly be
attributed, as Feder et al. (1988a), Vandergeest (1995), Fujita (2003) and others suggest,
to little enforcement by forestry o±cials, the squatters' lack of knowledge about the law
and also the lack of clarity in the Act itself. In many instances, it was not until the
distribution of NS-3K from 1972 onwards and the LTP that households learned that they
could not obtain a full title for certain plots because they were located inside the forest
reserve. In addition, areas o±cially designated as forest reserves did not have carefully
delineated boundaries, and in many cases, areas not suited for agricultural purposes were
not selected. Likewise, many areas that were designated as forest reserves were already
partially or fully settled (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 1993). The Act
arbitrarily divided forest reserve from private land in identical agro-climatic zones and in
areas with similar sociopolitical structures.
In the Townsend-Thai dataset, roughly 60 percent of the villages surveyed fall on the
boundary or inside forest reserves, and roughly 20 percent of households have simultane-
ously plots outside the forest reserve, for which they have full titles, and inside the forest
reserve, for which they would be considered illegal squatters. Chirapanda (2000) also re-
ports that some villages' schools and other public amenities were sometimes located inside
o±cially declared forest areas. In these villages, while government agricultural extension
agents were helping farmers grow new crops, forestry o±cials could have arrested them
for illegally occupying the land.
This pattern of illegal occupation left the government with little or no option but to
legalize squatters. The Department of Land was ready to privatize land and issue title
8deeds under the Land Code of 1954, but the RFD was reluctant to give up jurisdiction
over demarcated forest reserve.
In the end, the government permitted the RFD to introduce a program in 1981 that
would recognize the rights of agricultural land holders inside forests, with a 5-year usufruct
licence (STK) that could be renewed if land had been continuously cultivated (Fujita,
2003). This certi¯cate only covered holdings of up to 2.4 hectares but in many areas,
as Feder et al. (1988b) report, squatters were not being clearly told the status of their
land above the covered limit. These squatters therefore became uncertain about their
continued ownership and ability to transfer land. In the Townsend-Thai data set, about
a quarter of all plots with an STK license exceeded the limit in size.
Furthermore, this certi¯cate prohibits its conversion into a title deed (NS-4) or cer-
ti¯cate of use (NS-3, NS-3K), it restricts transfer of holding to only by inheritance and
therefore prohibits the transfer of ownership or rental. More importantly, failure to comply
with these conditions could result in revocation of the usufruct rights without compensa-
tion. In conjunction with this program, the RFD increased surveillance of parks with the
assistance of military and police (Vandergeest, 1995 and Sato, 2000).11
As a result, despite villagers initially welcomed the program because it allowed them to
register with the RFD, Feder et al (1988b) conclude that uncertainty about their coverage
and the explicit threats could have reduced the sense of security acquired by squatters
after years of little interference from the authorities.
The STK project ended in 1993 when all the degraded forests were transferred to
the Agricultural Land Reform O±ce (ALRO) for redistribution, under the settlement
program to which we now turn.
2.3 Public Land: Land Reform Areas
The Agricultural Land Reform Act of 1975 tried to remedy the high rate of tenancy
in certain regions of the country, particularly the North and Central regions, the large
number of landless households and the already mentioned encroachment of public lands.
11The public support for RFD and the need for conservation and expansion of protected areas was
bolstered by two important incidents. First, in 1973, a group of military ¯gures were discovered hunting
in a Wildlife Sanctuary with high-caliber weapons and o±cial vehicles. Second, in 1989, mass land slides
killed hundreds of people in the South.
9The legislation called for the establishment of the Agricultural Land Reform O±ce
(ALRO) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives to serve as the implementing
agency. The objective of the law can be found in the following excerpt from Section 4
[Italics included]:
\Redistribution of land for farming and residential uses by allocating state land
or, land purchased or expropriated from landowners who do not themselves
cultivate or who own land in excess of what is stipulated by the Agricultural
Land Reform Act of 1975 to farmers who are landless or do not have su±cient
land for cultivation, and to farmers' institutions by means of lease and sale."
Thus the land reform law sought to redistribute land to landless households and to
provide special title deeds to squatters in public lands. While private land was acquired
voluntarily through direct purchase12, public land came from encroached national forest
reserves and other government land. The bene¯ciaries had the option to either lease or
buy from the government at a discount.
During the implementation of the land reform there was a shift in priorities. While in
the beginning the main focus was on confronting the high tenancy rates and landlessness
in the Central Plains, a few years later, the government realized that the encroachment
problems were serious and a®ected a much wider area across the country. Around 1978,
the ALRO thus adjusted its focus from buying land from private hands to allocating
public land that was either donated by the King or transferred from the RFD.
Table 2 reports the amount of land and number of bene¯ciaries declared under Land
Reform areas from 1975 to 2003 in previously private and public land. By the time the
Townsend-Thai dataset was collected in 1997, all provinces had land reform areas.13
Table 2 shows that the bulk of the land allocated comes from public land. As such,
the land reform achieved little redistribution because in public areas it only legalized
landholders in encroached forests. Most farmers continued to cultivate the same plots
12Although the law established the expropriation of land from large and absentee landowners, the
political will was so weak that land was never acquired through expropriation.
13The land reform program started in 1977 in both Central provinces and a year later in both Northeast
provinces.
10they long held, although they were not allowed to sell or lease the land. In this sense, the
SPK-4.01 was very similar to the STK issued by the RFD. As Fujita (2003) documents,
in some places existing STKs were exchanged for SPK-4.01s.
Suthiporn Chirapanda, deputy secretary-general of ALRO from 1982 until 1992, con-
cludes that lack of political will to solve the numerous problems and a major political
scandal forcing a change of government resulted in a relatively small program in terms of
land allocated and number of bene¯ciaries.14
Despite the program being small, the SPK-4.01 title was issued in roughly half of the
villages in the Townsend-Thai dataset. Of these villages, about two-thirds are located
inside forest areas, proving that the RFD did surrender land jurisdiction to the ALRO.
The rest are villages outside gazetted forests where either private land or other government
land was redistributed.
Similar to villages where STK certi¯cates were issued, we argue that the political
tension created by the land reform, and the explicit threats if the restrictions were violated,
led households in program villages to be reluctant to lease out other unsecured plots.
In the following section we develop a model that explores the implications of expropri-
ation risk on the land rental market. In particular, we derive pricing equations for both
types of land and testable implications of when each land type will be leased.
3 The Model
Consider an economy populated by N farmers that live in¯nite periods and have access
to a cultivation technology that uses land as the only input. There are, however, two
types of land, titled, LT and untitled LNT. Both types of land are equally productive but
unlike titled land that is secured, untitled land can be expropriated by the government
with probability Á if leased. The technology f(x) is increasing and concave in cultivated
land x and satis¯es the usual Inada conditions:
f(0) = 0; lim
x!0
f




14The number of bene¯ciaries as a fraction of total population ranges from 6.5 percent in Sisaket to
less than 2 percent in Lopburi.
11Farmers are born with an endowment of titled and untitled land. The total stock of
titled and untitled land is constant over time. Implicitly, we assume that the government










jt = LT; 8t; where j indexes the farmer:
Every period, farmers decide how much land to cultivate and how much land to purchase
or sell, for the next period. Although agricultural output is perishable, land is not, and
therefore, accumulation of land is the only way to transfer resources from one period to
the next. We assume farmers have linear period utility and discount the future at rate
¯.15 Let P i
t;Ri
t for i = T;NT be the price and rental rate of land of type i in period
t, respectively, and let xi
t be the land of type i cultivated in period t. Then the farmer
































































t is untitled land expropriated by the government and redistributed at the end of
period t, and ©t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if untitled land is leased, xNT
t < LNT
t .
The expectation is taken over all possible government allocations of expropriated land.
We now de¯ne an equilibrium for this economy:













































t=1 and the initial land
15We are ultimately interested in steady state land prices, and thus, since consumptions are constant,
the marginal utility of consumption in t and t+1 cancel out in the asset pricing equation and the choice













t=1 for j = 1;::;N solve
the agent's optimization problem.



























jt = LNT; 8t:
This economy has two rental rate steady state equilibria depending on the allocation
of untitled land. The ¯rst equilibrium achieves the ¯rst best allocation while the second
does not. To see this, one can think of the probability of expropriation as a tax to untitled
land if leased. As a result, depending on the initial land allocation, farmers may initially
trade untitled for tilted land to avoid leasing untitled land. After trading takes place, if
ownership of untitled land for some farmers are still higher than the average ownership,
then the second equilibrium arises, but if trading succeeds in redistributing untitled land
in such a way that no farmer has more untitled land than the average ownership, then
the ¯rst equilibrium is achieved.
In this equilibrium all untitled land is self-cultivated and never subject to expropria-
tion. All farmers cultivate the same amount of land equal to the average ownership, and
thus only titled land is leased to equalize the marginal product of land across farmers,
achieving a Pareto optimum. This equilibrium is also a steady state.
In the second equilibrium, due to the possibility of expropriation, there is a wedge
between what the lessor of untitled land earns and what the lessee would pay, a situation
well known in the taxation literature. Due to this price di®erential, the marginal returns
to land will not be equalized between the land owner and the tenant. As a result, farmers
who lease titled land earn a rent as it becomes a scarce factor.
Depending on the distribution of untitled land after re-trading, farmers that own more
untitled land than the average ownership, may decide not to lease out the excess untitled
13land because what they would earn in expectation is lower than the returns to cultivating
the land themselves. In this case, although there is no expropriation because all untitled
land is self-cultivated, the marginal product of land across farmers is not equalized and
thus the ¯rst best is not achieved. However, if the resulting distribution of untitled
land after trading is still \too unequal", some farmers may want to venture and lease
some untitled land. In this case many equilibria are possible depending on the farmers'
expectations of government allocation policies and the subsequent trading. Many of these
equilibria may eventually revert to the ¯rst equilibrium.16
We are particularly interested in the steady state equilibria as the data we have are
cross-sectional. We therefore assume that if the untitled land allocation is such that
untitled land is eventually leased, the government allocation policy and land endowments
are such that the ¯rst best can never be achieved via land trading. With this assumption,
the equilibria in this economy are given in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let LNT


























N , there exists two and possibly three groups of farmers of sizes
NRI, NI and NRO and two land cultivation levels xRI, xRO such that,
f
0(x




1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Á)
R
16If the government was to systematically redistribute expropriated land to farmers that are landless
or have relatively little land, in such a way that untitled land holdings became more equal over time,
then eventually untitled land would not be leased. Depending on the resulting distribution of untitled











RO = LNT + LT:
While NRI > 0;NI > 0 always, it may be the case that NRO = 0. The price of titled








1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Á)
:
Figure 1 plots the marginal product of land against untitled land ownership for both cases
of Proposition 1. In Case i), all farmers cultivate at the same scale. In Case ii) farmers
included in NRI have holdings of untitled land that satisfy LNT
j < xRI. Likewise, farmers
in NI hold untitled land that satisfy xRI < LNT
j < xRO. In this case, they lease out all
their titled land and only cultivate their untitled land. For these farmers, the marginal
product of land is given by the amount of untitled land own. Finally, farmers in NRO have
holdings of untitled land that satisfy LNT
j > xRO. In this case, they lease out all titled
land and also any untitled land in excess of xRO. Thus, if the agent with most untitled
land has less than xRO, then no agent will lease untitled land and NRO = 0. Notice that
in this case there is a positive probability of expropriation Á without any expropriation
taking place.













1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Á)
¯
If we let the discount rate ¯ = 1
1+r, where r denotes the interest rate, we can then write,
RT
P T = r and
RNT
P NT = r + Á: (1)
The expression above indicates that the cap ratio for untitled land is positively related to
Á and r. This is a testable implication that will be explored in Section 5.
In sum, if there is a risk of expropriation Á > 0, then most, if not all of the land leased
15will be titled. In addition, the cap ratio will be higher for untitled land. However, if there
is no risk of expropriation, then agents are indi®erent to leasing either type of land and
the cap ratio is equalized.
3.1 Discussion
In the context described by the model, agents could also avoid having to lease untitled
land by hiring laborers that would work under them. Since these employees would be
supervised and would have no actual discretion in managerial decisions, landowners would
appear to be self-cultivating the land and thus would not be subject to expropriation. The
model, however, does not allow for this possibility as household labor is considered ¯xed.
In other words, instead of using the labor market, agents in the model can only adjust
their production decisions using the land rental market.
The data described in the next Section show that most agricultural activities are
undertaken by family labor, as assumed in the model. Although laborers are hired,
they only perform speci¯c tasks such as land preparation or harvesting. The supply
of agricultural laborers may be restricted due to two reasons. First, because there are
better paying o®-farm employment opportunities, as the data in the next Section seem
to suggest. Second, following Jacoby and Mansuri (2004), because supervision costs may
be so high (or managerial ability so low) that landowners prefer to lease land, even facing
expropriation, than to become managers. Under this last interpretation, the cost of
expropriation can be seen as a lower bound to these supervision costs.
4 Data
The data come from the Townsend-Thai dataset, a specialized but substantial cross sec-
tional survey conducted in Thailand in May l997. It contains a wealth of pre-crisis so-
cioeconomic data on 2,880 households.17 The survey instruments collected current and
retrospective information on landholding patterns and characteristics about all plots cul-
tivated and owned. The sample is special in that it was restricted to two provinces in the
relatively poor semi arid Northeast and two provinces in the more industrialized central
17See Townsend et al. (1997) for more details on the data.
16corridor around Bangkok. Within each province, 48 villages were selected in a strati-
¯ed clustered random sample at the sub-county level. The strati¯cation, as described
in Binford et al. (2003), ensured a representative sample of forested and non-forested
sub-counties and excluded urban sub-counties. Within each village, 15 households were
selected at random.
As an example of a province, Figure 2 contains a map of Chachoengsao in the central
region displaying the land use and location of the surveyed villages. The area in light gray
denotes land used for agriculture, whereas the darker area is forest cover. The map also
shows, with a thick line, the o±cial boundary of the forest area according to the Forest
Reserve Act of 1964. It is clear from Figure 2 that most of the land o±cially declared as
protected forest is used for agriculture. In addition, while some villages fall inside this
forest reserve, others are located far away from it.18 Villages are shown in di®erent shapes
depending on the land ownership titles reported by the households interviewed. There is
a sense in which villages with STK titles, issued by the RFD to squatters inside forest
reserves (square), or SPK-4.01 titles, issued by the ALRO in land reform areas (triangle),
are nearby or inside forest reserve areas. There are however some villages with SPK-4.01
that are far away from protected forest areas. In these villages, government land (other
than protected forest) or private land bought by the government was allocated through
the land reform program.19 Thanks to the sampling scheme, villages are roughly split
inside and outside protected forest areas, making it a unique dataset to understand the
e®ects of government policies in forest reserve areas.
Tables 3-5 report, in turn, the characteristics of villages, households and plots. We
divide the sample into Forest and non-Forest on the one hand, and Program (P) and
non-Program on the other to ease comparisons across sub-samples.
Table 3 shows that forest villages, compared to non-forest villages, have been estab-
lished later, evidencing the pattern of encroachment into the forest. However, most of
these villages were established long before the Forest Reserve Act of 1964, explaining why
18Villages are classi¯ed as forest (F) villages if they are either located inside a forest protected area
according to the TDRI GIS data, or whether the key informant reports that the village has land under
a protected forest. The correlation between these two measures is .92.
19Villages are classi¯ed as program (P) villages if SPK-4.01 and/or STK titles were issued according to
the key informant questionnaire (village questionnaire) or the households interviewed with the household
questionnaire.
17even inside o±cially declared forest areas most of the land is used for agriculture (Ministry
of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2003 p. 62).
Table 3 also shows that among forest villages, program villages have less titled land
but are more likely to have a cooperative. In addition, the connecting road is more likely
to be paved. Although the rest of variables are not signi¯cant, among villages established
before the Forest Reserve Act of 1964, program villages were on average established earlier.
Also, more non-program villages had common land, which is land typically forested,
managed and protected by the community.20 These di®erences in village characteristics
seem consistent with the targeting criteria that the RFD and ALRO used (Ministry of
Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2003 p. 64; Asian Development Bank, 2002 p. 61 and
Fujita, 2003). Since the government perceived these programs as a ¯rst step towards
future privatization of the land, STK and later ALRO titles were issued in degraded
forests suitable for agriculture, that is, villages that would never revert back to being
forest reserve again.
The basic identi¯cation strategy in this paper can be seen in the ¯rst two rows of Table
4 which reports the characteristics of households. While in program villages households
tend to lease secured plots, the reverse happens in non-forest and non-program villages.
If we restrict the sample to households that simultaneously hold titled and untitled plots,
we ¯nd that in program and forest areas, 64 percent of leased plots are titled while for own
and cultivated plots this percentage drops to 41. In non-program and non-forest areas,
we also ¯nd the exact opposite: only 46 percent of rented plots are titled, versus a full 68
percent for owned and cultivated plots. This percentage of households with both titled
and untitled land is highest in the forest and program areas, con¯rming the anecdotal
evidence of Section 2.
Table 5 reports the type of title for all plots in the sample, which includes those owned
and cultivated, those rented in and those rented out. We consider titled plots those with
certi¯cates NS-4, NS-3 and NS-3K, which allow the owner to transact freely and are
also accepted indistinctively by banks as collateral.21 Plots having any other less secured
20In 2002, a controversial bill was passed recognizing the right of forest-based communities to manage
their forest. However, the version that was ¯nally approved prohibited community forests in protected
areas, as had been advocated by village people, NGOs and academics, involved in negotiations with the
government and RFD o±cials for many years (Vandergeest, 1995 and 1996; Sato, 2000).
21See Section 2 for a detailed explanation of the di®erent certi¯cates of ownership.
18certi¯cate are considered untitled. By de¯nition, there are no STK or SPK-4.01 titles in
non-program areas, and no STK title issued in a non-forest area. Notice that there are
a few untitled plots in non-forest and non-program areas. These plots could have been
cleared from government or royal land other than protected forest, or could be located in
private land but the owners never obtained a title deed.
Table 4 also shows that only 3 percent of households have members who are primarily
employed as agricultural laborers. This number contrasts with the 38 percent of household
with members employed as o®-farm laborers. In addition, the majority of agricultural
laborers are paid on a daily basis, suggesting that they are only hired during short spells for
speci¯c activities. Table 4 also shows that 62 percent of households engaged in agriculture
use (unpaid) family labor. All this evidence suggests that agricultural labor is mostly
undertaken by household members, thus justifying the assumption of restricted labor
markets in the model of Section 3.
In this context, the introduction of RFD or ALRO titles may have a®ected family
labor intensity in program areas, especially in forest areas, as compared to other areas.
Table 4 reports the number of farming adults per hectare, showing that labor is more
intensely used in non-program areas. Thus, counter to our intuition, we would conclude
that land markets may be functioning better in program areas as family labor is allocated
more e±ciently. However, a glance at Type of Plot columns in Table 5 reveals that in
program areas there are relatively more plots (and area) devoted to ¯eld crops, requiring
less labor than rice. Thus, by looking at the allocation of family labor in general we
cannot say much about the e±ciency of land markets across sub-samples as households
seem to be using di®erent technologies requiring di®erent labor intensities.
When we restrict the sample to households only growing rice, we obtain further ev-
idence of land rental market imperfections in forest and program areas.22 According to
Case ii) of Proposition 1 and the right panel of Figure 1, when undocumented land is
leased but subject to expropriation, households that lease out land will cultivate more
land than those that lease it in, assuming that all households have the same ability and
access to the same technology. Table 4 reports total land cultivated per adult for house-
holds that only self-cultivate, lease in and self-cultivate, or lease out and self-cultivate.
22Roughly two thirds of the farming households grow only rice, 15 percent only ¯eld crops and the
remaining 15 percent grow both.
19While in general households that lease in land also cultivate more land, possibly because
they are more productive than those that leasing it out, in forest and program areas we
¯nd the opposite. Thus, households would like to lease more land (in and out) but the
fear of expropriation prevents it.
To further bolster this argument, we compute a measure of inequality in total land
cultivated and owned for the same sample of rice-growing households. Table 6 reports the
Theil index decomposed into households living in forest or non-forest areas and program
or non-program villages.23
The Theil index for owned land is always larger than that of cultivated land, suggesting
that rental markets help in allocating land e±ciently. Overall, the distribution of owned
land is signi¯cantly more unequal in non-program areas than in program areas, but not
that of cultivated land. Only in the forest and program areas is cultivated land inequality
signi¯cantly higher than that of forest and non-program areas. This is remarkable given
that inequality of owned land in forest and program is the lowest of all bins while that in
forest and non-program in the highest. This again suggests that land markets in forest
and program areas may not function properly as the allocation of cultivated land via the
rental market is restricted.
The model also suggests that after the introduction of the government program, one
would expect households to trade land. That is, in order to avoid expropriation, house-
holds with excess untitled land would try to exchange it for titled land that would later
be leased. In program areas, therefore, one would expect the land sale market to be more
active after the issuance of special titles, and that the new sales would result in untitled
land being more equally distributed after the policy is implemented.
Table 7 explores the ¯rst hypothesis by looking at the percentage of households across
sub-samples that bought and/or sold land. There are signi¯cant overall di®erences across
sub-samples in the percentage of households that bought or sold land over the last 20
years, the percentage that only bought land and the percentage that bought only titled
and only untitled. It is reassuring to see that very few households bought simultaneously
titled and untitled land, as the majority of households that bought land, purchased one










¹ x is the mean of variable x. It can be shown that the Theil index is a particular case of the Generalized
Entropy Index with ® = 1. See Cowell (2003) for more details.
20type of land only. Again, this evidence does suggest that the land sale market was more
active in program areas.
Finally, Table 8 decomposes the inequality in the distribution of ownership of untitled
land before and after 1977 for households that existed in 1977. We use how long the
household has been in possession of the plot to reconstruct, from current land ownership,
how much untitled land it had before and after 1980. Unfortunately, we cannot use
households that sold land as we do not know what title the land had when it was sold.
Table 8 shows that untitled land was, in all sub-samples, more unequally distributed
before than after the policy. In addition, the distribution of untitled land is more equal in
program areas than in non-program areas, and among program areas, it is more equally
distributed in forest areas. It thus seems that households allocated untitled land through
the market, in an e®ort to minimize having to lease untitled land. This e®ort, however,
did not su±ce because as we will see in the next section, untitled land is being leased.
4.1 Alternative Explanations
Despite the fact that the evidence presented above is consistent with a fear of expropriation
story, there could be other explanations for the observed pattern of land leases, especially
in forest areas. For example, if most plots in program areas were issued a special title, then
little land would be leased, so that cultivated land would equal owned land, as observed in
program and forest areas in Table 6. We ¯nd that in program areas less than 30 percent
of land has a special title, so this story can be dismissed.
Another explanation consistent with titled plots being predominantly leased is as
follows. Untitled land could be recently cleared land, thus being more productive than
titled land. In this case, households with excess land would cultivate the most productive
land while leasing the least productive which happens to be titled land because it is older.
Table 9 shows that is not the case. First, the owner has been in possession of titled and
untitled land in forest areas for roughly the same time.24 Second, the price per hectare of
titled land is higher, not lower than that of untitled land.
24Although in program areas titled land is signi¯cantly older than untitled land, the di®erence disap-
pears when we only consider households with cultivated and rented plots (or with both titled and untitled
land, not shown).
215 Econometric Framework
The discussion in the previous section and the model of Section 3 highlights the fact that
the decision to lease land may be in°uenced by whether or not the landlord lives in a
program village. In these villages, the landowner faces expropriation of ALRO or RFD
plots if these are leased. But more importantly, residents in these areas may believe that
unsecured plots will also be expropriated if leased, and thus, they will avoid leasing out
untitled plots.
In addition, although not explored in the model, in villages where there is no risk of
expropriation, the land owner may prefer to lease unsecured plots if these are of lower
quality and tenancy is ine±cient. The argument here is that titled land may be correlated
with unobserved land quality and unobserved land quality may also drive leasing decisions.
The latter could happen if there is adverse selection in the leasing market or if renters
face moral hazard as they have an incentive to abuse the land (Bell, 1977, Shaban, 1987,
Jacoby and Mansuri, 2003). Under both cases, the landowner would respond by only
leasing untitled land, but this would not be an e®ect of land titling per se but rather of
unobserved land quality. In any event, the decision to lease an untitled plots may depend
on how important the fear of expropriation is.
The basic regression model we use to explain whether plot i by household j is leased
(in or out) or self-cultivated is the following:
Lij = ®j + ±FPFj £ Pj £ NTij + ±FnPFj £ (1 ¡ Pj) £ NTij (2)
+ ±nFP(1 ¡ Fj) £ Pj £ NTij + ±nFnP(1 ¡ Fj) £ (1 ¡ Pj) £ NTij + X
0
ij¯ + ²ij
where Lij denotes the leasing decision with value 1 if the plot is leased, ®j captures the
household ¯xed e®ect, Fj is a dummy with value 1 if household j lives in a forest village, Pj
if household j lives in a program village and NTij takes value 1 if plot i cultivated and/or
owned by household j is does not have full ownership rights (NS-4, NS-3 or NS-3K).
Finally, Xij are plot level characteristics.
If households living in program areas believe that unsecured leased plots may be
expropriated, we should expect ±FP < 0, ±nFP < 0 as titled plots are more likely to be
leased in these areas. Likewise, if expropriation is not an issue, and land rights proxy for
22unobserved land quality and tenancy may be ine±cient, we would expect ±nFnP > 0 as
untitled plots are more likely to be leased.
This di®erences-in-di®erences approach allows us to make sharper predictions about
the behavior of the land market. As posited above (although with the opposite e®ect) or
in the alternative stories of the previous section, any story about unobserved land quality
fails to rationalize why one would expect land rights to matter in forest and program
areas but not elsewhere. However, it is precisely in program areas where restrictions are
enforced that one would expect landowners to fear expropriation.
We now push this hypothesis further and in the spirit of Jimenez (1984), we measure
a subjective risk premium by estimating the cap ratios derived in Section 3. We use
available data on the asking and rental price of leased plots.25
Since the probability of expropriation is highest for unsecured plots located in program







= °0 + °rSIj + °FPFj £ Pj £ NTij + °FnPFj £ (1 ¡ Pj) £ NTij (3)
+ °nFP(1 ¡ Fj) £ Pj £ NTij + °nFnP(1 ¡ Fj) £ (1 ¡ Pj) £ NTij + ²ij
where SI is a dummy indicating access of household j to a given ¯nancial institution that
collects deposits either because such institution is present in the village or because the
household reports having savings in that institution. If there is expropriation risk, we
should expect °FP > 0;°nFP > 0.
It would seem that there is some di±culty in testing the proposition because land in
forest areas cannot be legally sold since it is government property. However, according to
Feder et al. (1988) and a government report (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives,
1993), in practice all land in Thailand, including forest reserve land, is traded.
25The survey asked the current value of the plot but not the rental value if it was leased. However, the
income and expenditure section of the survey are very detailed so payments from renting land as revenue
or expenditures were recorded. Since the amounts reported were totals for all plots, we focus on those
households that lease in and/or out at most one plot.
236 Results
Table 10 presents the estimation results for the regression of the determinants of plot rental
given in (2). We consider two di®erent speci¯cations depending on whether village or
household ¯xed e®ects are included. When village ¯xed e®ects are included, we control for
households characteristics but the coe±cients are not reported due to lack of space. These
speci¯cations have fewer observations due to missing variables in some of the controls. We
run each speci¯cation using the sample of all plots and, alternatively, only own and rent
out plots in order to avoid a potential double-counting problem of rented plots.26 In each
case, the sub-sample of plots with either STK or SPK-4.01 titles is excluded. We run each
speci¯cation using OLS method and conditional logit. By de¯nition, the conditional logits
are estimated using only the sample of households with multiple plots that simultaneously
rent out and self-cultivate. Thus, the number of observations is smaller.
Across speci¯cations, leased plots tend to be of larger size and farther away from the
house. The estimated role of land security coincides with the discussion of Section 2 and
the theory of Section 3. When village ¯xed e®ects are included, land rights only matter
in forest and program areas matter given that the restrictions in the program titles where
only enforced inside forest reserves. However, especially in the speci¯cation where all plots
are used, land rights may be proxying for land quality in non-forest areas as unsecured
plots are more likely to be leased out. This e®ect disappears, however, when household
¯xed e®ects are included. In this speci¯cation, land rights still matter in enhancing the
land rental market in program and forest areas.
We now turn to the estimation results of the cap ratio in (3) using titled and untitled
rented plots, excluding those with program titles. These are reported in Table 11. We ¯nd
evidence of a larger cap ratio for unsecured plots in forest and program areas, indicating
the presence of a risk of expropriation premium. A back of the envelope calculation from
the estimated coe±cients provides an expected probability of expropriation in forest and
program areas of 6 or 17 percent, depending on the controls used.27 In a very di®erent
26A rented plot could be double-counted if both the landlord and the tenants were in the sample. This
plot would be recorded under the landlord as rented out and under the tenant as rented in. In any event,
since no e®ort was made during the data collection to match landlords and tenants, the probability is
double-counting is low.
27Since the regression is run in logs, the parameter Á is computed as follows: Á = e°0+°r [e°FP ¡ 1].
24context, Jacoby et al. (2002) estimate a median (mean) hazard rate of 10 (16) percent.
From the data, we estimate that 3 percent of households in forest and program areas
have leased STK or SPK-4.01 plots. This means that in the course of 20 years, and
according to the estimated probability of expropriation, between 2.1 percent and 3.5
percent of households would see their program titled plots expropriated, depending on
the assumptions.28 Surprisingly, the data show that in forest and program areas, an
average of 2.5 percent of households report having land expropriated over the last 20
years.29
Thus, although the model suggests that the probability of expropriation could be
compatible with much lower expropriation taking place, we ¯nd that the estimated (ex-
pected) rate of expropriation roughly coincides with the rate at which the government has
expropriated land. When STK and SPK-4.01 are included in the regression (not shown
in Table 11) the estimated risk premium is always signi¯cant and slightly higher in most
speci¯cations. This means that the subjective risk premium may not be much higher for
STK and SPK-4.01, and so the use of the subjective risk premium Á = 0:61 is warranted.
Using the estimated probability of expropriation we can compute the wedge between
the marginal productivity of households that lease in as compared to those that lease out
(see Proposition 1). If we use the implied interest rate from Table 11, we ¯nd a di®erence
in marginal productivity of 80 percent.30 This di®erence assumes that all households have
the same productivity and access to the same technology.31 From Table 4, it seems that
28Let ° be the percentage of people in a given year that violate the special title restrictions by leasing
out program plots. The upper and lower bounds on the probability of being expropriated over 20 years
can be de¯ned by assuming that a fraction ° of either di®erent people violate the rules or the same
fraction ° violate the rules every year. If a di®erent percentage ° of people were to violate the rules, then
one would see a percentage
£
1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á°)20¤
of people that would claim expropriation over the course of
20 years. Notice that this fraction converges to 1 as the number of years increases to in¯nity. The lower
bound assumes that the same percentage of people violates the rule every year. In this case, a fraction £
1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á)20¤
° would claim expropriation over 20 years. This fraction converges to ° as the number
of years increases arbitrarily. Using the fact that ° = 0:03 from the data and that Á = 0:061 as per the
speci¯cation in (3) that controls for the existence of a ¯nancial institution in the village, the lower bound
is 2.1 percent and the upper bound 3.5 percent.
29Although the survey did not ask directly whether households had land expropriated, it does ask
whether households lost land in the last 20 years. We then tabulate the \Other" category as a reason for
the loss, and ¯nd a few households who report expropriation.
30If instead we use the 5 percent deposit rate paid by BAAC, the di®erence in marginal productivity
drops to 50 percent. The wedge or di®erence in marginal productivity is computed as
Á
r+Á.
31When we run the cap ratio regression for the plots owned by the sample of households that grow
rice, the di®erence in marginal productivity is only slightly lower.
25among rice growers, those households that lease in land are more productive than those
leasing out because on average they cultivate more land per adult. Therefore, although
the true estimate is probably lower, the perceived fear of expropriation results in a sizeable
distortion.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows empirically how a government policy created an unforseen negative
externality. In this sense, we go a step further than Feder et al. (1988b) and argue that
the issuance of land reform and STK titles was not only ine®ective because it provided
small private bene¯ts to holders, but that in fact, it distorted the land market by triggering
a sense of insecurity among land owners.
Despite equity arguments in favor of land reforms, in Thailand there has historically
been little land inequality. In addition, as documented in several articles that appearing
in the Bangkok Post and Vandergeest (1996), land reform in Thailand over the last decade
has been subject to land grabbing and rent seeking by the wealthy. It may thus seem
that the cost from reduced e±ciency outweighs the bene¯t of redistributing.
More generally, the paper sheds light into the relevance of the timing and the design
of property rights reforms. The lesson to be learned from Thailand is that partial rights
may have led to a worse situation than no rights at all.
A more sensible policy would be to provide full ownership rights to squatters in these
areas, which for the most part have long been settled, are suitable for agriculture and
do not pose a threat to the environment. In frontier areas where continuing cultivation
causes damage to the environment, the control may be best left to the government (Asian
Development Bank, 2002).
The ¯ndings of this paper support Banerjee's (1999) argument that allocated land
should bear the right to be leased. If RFD or ALRO titles allowed for this possibility,
one would avoid some of the ine±ciencies still observed nowadays in program and forest
areas.
In this sense, the recent government policy that promotes \asset capitalization" is
encouraging. In 2003, the Assets Capitalization Bureau was established to review the
property rights of assets so that they could be used as collateral, thereby improving the
26access to capital of their owners. Since land is one of the assets considered, government
agencies such as ALRO and RFD have to revise the regulations in order to facilitate the
transferring and leasing of land. In some instances, program titles may be converted to full
titles, as the STK program intended in its origins but it never implemented. Although it
is still too early to assess the impact of this new policy, the ¯ndings here augur its success.
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30Table 1: Distribution of Sampled Plots by Document Type in Buriram
Before LTP After LTP
Agricultural Residential Agricultural Residential
Plots Plots Plots Plots
Document Type
NS-4 0.10 0.04 0.40 0.30
NS-3 or NS-3K 0.30 0.20 0.16 0.24
Other 0.60 0.76 0.44 0.46
N. Observations 278 171 749 1,282
Note: An observation is a plot. Data from before the LTP come from Table 1 in
Chalamwong et al.(1988) study. Data after the LTP come from the Townsend-Thai
data set.
Table 2: Land Reform Areas and Bene¯ciaries: 1975-2003
Public Land Private Land
A. Decl A. Alloc N. Benef A. Decl A. Alloc N. Benef
North 2,364.8 845.8 377,250 26.6 25.5 8,400
North East 4,553.3 2,054.4 794,581 1.9 1.4 756
Buri Ram 331.6 91.2 43,608 0.3 0.2 175
Si Sa Ket 243.3 163.2 91,200
Central 1,423.7 491.2 150,156 48.9 47.2 20,148
Chachoengsao 106.5 49.6 12,081 8.7 8.0 3,095
Lop Buri 78.8 45.8 11,105 4.7 4.2 1,712
South 1,219.3 377.2 157,019 0.3 0.2 107
Whole Kingdom 9,561.1 3,768.6 1,479,006 77.6 74.3 29,411
Note: Data come from ALRO and own calculations. Area Declared (A. Decl) is total
area declared as Reform Area in 1,000 hectares. Area Allocated (A. Alloc) is actual land
allocated to date in 1,000 hectares. Number of Bene¯ciaries (N. Benef) are individuals.
31Table 3: Village Characteristics
Whole Sample Forest Non-Forest
P non-P P non-P
Mean SD Means
Years since establishment 97.7 76.2 73.0 87.1 79.8 131.8
Years since establishmenta 111.2 76.1 96.6 90.4 87.9 136.3
Village Population 741.6 932.4 731.4 607.4 603.1 849.9
Landless households (Pct) 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.24 0.30
Titled land (Pct) 0.62 0.44 0.28 0.61 0.60 0.94
Common Land in village (1=yes) 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.33 0.22 0.08
Formal Bank in vil. (1 = yes) 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.39 0.64 0.47
Cooperative in vil. (1 = yes) 0.19 0.40 0.16 | 0.28 0.23
River in village (1 = yes) 0.12 0.32 0.13 | 0.11 0.14
Canal in village (1 = yes) 0.21 0.41 0.13 0.11 0.25 0.30
Kms. to main road 2.70 4.54 3.91 2.17 2.40 1.90
Pct. pavement in sec. road 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.26 0.42 0.44
N. of Observations 191 64 18 36 73
a Computed excluding villages established after 1964.
Note: Data come from the key informant survey of the Townsend-Thai dataset. Each observation
is a village. P refers to Program villages.
32Table 4: Household Characteristics
Whole Sample Forest Non-Forest
P non-P P non-P
Mean SD Means
Land Characteristics
Pct. Of Own-Cultivated Plots with full rights title 0.60 0.47 0.26 0.63 0.58 0.92
Pct. Of Rented Plots with full rights title 0.65 0.47 0.34 0.72 0.59 0.89
Pct. Of Rented Out Plots with full rights title 0.69 0.45 0.42 0.75 0.69 0.90
Pct. Of Households with titled and untitled land 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.10
Total Land Cultivated per Adult for Rice Farmersa
Households that only self-cultivate 1.42 1.33 1.44 1.35 1.41 1.43
Households that lease in 2.03 1.91 1.51 1.80 2.63 2.03
Households that lease out 1.67 1.59 1.78 1.60 1.08 1.80
Total Land Owned in hectares 2.70 4.69 3.31 2.81 3.19 1.88
Total Land Cultivated in hectares 3.15 4.63 3.44 3.12 4.32 2.33
Household Characteristics
Pct. Of Members in Agriculture 0.48 0.38 0.53 0.60 0.49 0.40
Pct. Of Households with Agric. Laborers 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Pct. Of Households with o®-farm Laborers 0.38 0.48 0.33 0.21 0.43 0.4
Pct. Of Households with Family Labor in Agric. 0.62 0.49 0.68 0.73 0.57 0.66
Size of Household 4.57 1.96 4.66 4.43 4.47 4.58
N. Adults per Hectare 1.25 1.58 1.15 1.20 1.05 1.49
N. Relatives in Village 3.83 3.40 3.75 4.74 4.11 3.55
N. Children outside Village 1.47 1.96 1.39 1.41 1.42 1.58
Years of Residence in Village 34.6 19.3 28.4 32.9 35.7 40.0
Sex of Head (1 = Male) 0.77 0.42 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.73
Age of Head (Years) 51.4 13.6 49.2 48.8 51.8 53.8
Education of Head (Years) 4.12 2.62 3.98 4.13 3.72 4.43
Member of Committee Village (1 = Yes) 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08
Savings from Com. Bank or Baac (1 = Yes) 0.70 0.46 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.72
Household Wealth in Million Baht 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.09
Agricultural Wealth in Million Baht 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Constraints in Farming (1 = Yes) 0.58 0.49 0.64 0.66 0.59 0.49
Related to the Tenant 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.19
Related to the Landowner 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.30 0.18 0.13
N. of Observations 2,874 973 270 540 1,091
a A sample of 1,415 farmers only growing rice is used.
Note: Data come from Townsend-Thai dataset. Each observation is a household. P refers to Program
villages. Constraints Related to Tenant refer to responses to the question \What prevents you from increasing
the size of your farm?" like \not enough land" or \not enough money to buy land" while responses like
\not enough labor to hire" refer to constraints related Landowner.
33Table 5: Plot Characteristics
Whole Sample Forest Non-Forest
P non-P P non-P
Mean SD Means
Type of Title
NS-4 0.42 0.49 0.16 0.45 0.35 0.71
NS-3 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.17 0.17 0.18
NS-3K 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
SK-1 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02
SPK - 4.01 0.11 0.32 0.18 | 0.24 |
STK 0.01 0.10 0.03 | | |
Tax (Por Bor Tor) 0.09 0.28 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.01
No Document 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.04
Type of Plot
Residential 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.4
Paddy 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.45 0.32 0.39
Field 0.14 0.35 0.23 0.09 0.19 0.05
N. of Observations 7,892 2,762 843 1,491 2,796
Note: Data come from the Townsend-Thai dataset. Each observation is a plot. P
refers to Program villages.
Table 6: Cultivated and Owned Land Inequality per Adult
Forest Non-Forest Total
Program Areas
Total Cultivated Land 0.38¤¤ 0.35 0.37
Total Owned Land 0.50¤¤ 0.60 0.54¤¤
Non-Program Areas
Total Cultivated Land 0.33¤¤ 0.35 0.34
Total Owned Land 0.64¤¤ 0.60 0.62¤¤
Total
Total Cultivated Land 0.37 0.35 0.36
Total Owned Land 0.54¤¤ 0.60¤¤ 0.66
Note: Data come the Townsend-Thai dataset. A sample of 1,415 farming households
only growing rice is used. The symbol ¤¤ indicate signi¯cant di®erences across sub-
samples at a 5 percent level. Standard errors are computed using the bootstrap
method with 500 repetitions.
34Table 7: Trading of Land After 1980
Whole Sample Forest Non-Forest
P non-P P non-P
Mean SD Means
Pct. Of Households that:::
Bought or sold land 0.34 0.47 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.33
Only sold land 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.11
Only bought land 0.21 0.41 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.19
Bought Titled and untitled land 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
Only bought titled land 0.12 0.33 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.20
Only bought untitled land 0.12 0.33 0.25 0.13 0.09 0.02
N. of Observations 2,874 973 270 540 1,091
Note: Data come from the Townsend-Thai dataset.
Table 8: Owned Untitled Land Inequality
Forest Non-Forest Total
Program Areas
Before (1977) 1.23 1.63 1.37
After (1997) 0.83 1.18 0.96
Non-Program Areas
Before (1977) 1.97 3.43 3.01
After (1997) 1.36 2.93 2.40
Total
Before (1977) 1.37 2.48 1.90
After (1997) 0.94 2.03 1.46
Note: Data come the Townsend-Thai dataset. A sample of 1,896 house-
holds that did not sell land and that have been household heads for at
least 20 years is used. The di®erence in inequality between 1977 and
1997 is signi¯cant at the 1 percent level for all sub-samples. Standard






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 11: Determinants of Cap Ratio
The dependent variable is the cap ratio. Since the rental value for each leased plot is not reported, but
only the total revenue and expenses from land rental, we only use households that lease in and/or our at
most one plot. In the regressions, only titled and untitled plots (other than STK or SPK-4.01) are used.
SE in parenthesis. P refers to Program village, while F to Forest village. ¤ signi¯cant at 10% and ¤¤¤
signi¯cant at 1%.
No Controls Village Household
Plot Characteristics
No rights £ F and P 1.611¤¤¤ 1.667¤¤¤ 1.940¤¤¤
(0.204) (0.215) (0.226)
No rights £ F and non-P 0.746¤ 0.591 0.731¤
(0.414) (0.392) (0.447)
No rights £ non-F and P -0.197 -0.387 -0.110
(0.446) (0.446) (0.479)
No rights £ non-F nor P -0.204 -0.024 -0.115
(0.527) (0.473) (0.519)
Savings Institution
Commercial Bank or BAAC branch in village 0.861¤¤¤
(0.227)
Savings Cooperative in village 0.019
(0.299)
Village-level Micro¯nance Institution 0.947¤¤¤
(0.238)
Household has savings in Com. Bank or BAAC -0.206
(0.241)
Household has savings in Cooperative -0.784¤¤¤
(0.319)
Household has savings in village-level institution 0.943¤¤¤
(0.379)
Constant -4.572¤¤¤ -5.201¤¤¤ -4.524¤¤¤
(0.141) (0.194) (0.228)
N. Observations 425 425 425
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Figure 1: Marginal Product of Land in Proposition 1 Case i) (left) and Case ii) (right).
Figure 2: Land Use in Chachoengsao
Location of surveyed villages comes from Townsend-Thai data. Land use and
forest reserve boundaries come from TDRI data.
39